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It is generally  agreed  that the arrangements  that  Among  their findings:
have regulated  trade in textiles  and clothing  have
slowed  the natural  shift in comparative  * Relatively  high utilization  rates  across
advantage  from industrial  countries  to develop-  exporters  suggest  a relatively  high degree (and
ing countries.  But there is quite a bit of disagree-  stability)  of quota  bindingness  across  exporters.
ment about  how restrictive  the Multi-Fibre
Agreements  (MFA)  are.  *  Overshipment  was highest  for the most
important  (by shipment  value)  products.
Faird, de Melo, and Takacs  address  the
potential  sources  of allocative  inefficiency  * There is concentration  among  a few leading
occasioned  by the MFA and search for evidence  exporters  (China,  Hong Kong,  Taiwan,  and
that the MWA  has indeed  led to such inefficiency.  Thailand)  and a few importers  (Benelux,
Germany,  and the United  Kingdom).
In a theoretical  section,  they  identify five
sources  of inefficiency  relating  to allocations,  * The data suggest  a positive  correlation
across  countries,  across  consumers,  and among  between  the coefficients  of variation  in prices
firms within  constrained  countries.  and quota  utilization  rates for China, Hong
Kong,  and Korea.  This suggests  that prices are
In the empirical  part of the paper,  Prst  they  related,  as one would expect,  to the degree  of
provide  evidence  of the restrictiveness  of the  bindingness.
quota arrangements  from trends in import  shares
for aggregate  categories  of textiles  and clothing,  * The data suggest  that binding  quotas would
before  and during the MFA.  Then they provide  be associated  with higher import  prices.
evidence  from a detailed  examination  of quota
utilization  rates and price differentials  among  EC
importing  countries.
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The complicated  - and purposely opaque  - arrangements  that have regulated international  trade
in textiles and clothing have been the subject  of a lively debate and of much literature. It is generally
agreed that these arrangements  have slowed down the natural shift in trade flows due to comparative
advantage  from developed  to developing  countries, and within developing  countries  from the NICs
towards the least developed. It is also agreed that trade in textiles and clothing is the single  most
important  source of developing  countries' foreign exchange  earnings  from manufactures  as well as an
important  source of employment. (Textiles  and clothing  trade accounted  for 6 percent of world
merchandise  trade in 1986 with developed country  exports of $71 billion and $43 billion of
developing  countries  exports).  Beyond  these rather general statements,  most work on the economic
effects  of the MFA has concentrated  on the effects on developed  importing countries, for example,
Morkre (1984) and Cline (1990), so there is relatively  little evidence  on the economic  effects of the
MFA on developing  countries. Notable exceptions  are Trela and Whalley (1990a) and the papers in
Hamilton  (1990).
In fact, there is quite a lot of disagreement  as to the degree and trends in restrictiveness  of the
MFA. Summarizing  recent evidence,  Hamilton and Martin (1990, p. 4) state 'Clearly, the evidence
presented  in this volume suggests  that the MFA quotas are binding in many product categories..  ..
Likewise,  Erzan, (Goto  and Holmes (1990)  provide evidence  of rising quota utilization  rates in the
1980s,  particularly in the EEC and argue that the gains to the marginal  suppliers from restrictions  on
established  exporters  are not large.  On the other hand, Cline (1990), argues that considerable
adjustment  through downsizing  has occurred in Western  Europe and Japan and in the U.S. textile
sector. He concludes  that liberalization  would only entail  substantial  adjustment  through downsizing
of the U.S. apparel sector.2
The purpose of this paper is to give a fairly systematic  discussion  of the potential  sources of
allocative  inefficiency  occasioned  by the MFA and to look for evidence  that the MFA has indeed led
to such inefficiency. We cannot expect to settle the controversy  but hope to bring some perspective
on the debate by our eclectic  approach.
The remainder  of the paper is organized  as follows. In section  II, we identify  the various
sources of inefficiency  that arise from the MFA.  We identify five sources of inefficiency  due to:  (1)
reallocations  of production  from constrained  exporting  countries  to domestic suppliers and among
constrained  exporting  countries; (2) reallocations  of production  from constrained  exporting  countries
to unconstrained  countries; (3) inefficient  allocation  of production  among firms in constrained
exporting  countries; (4) reallocations  among  consumers  located in dif.erent constrained  importing
countries; and (5) inefficient  allocation  between  consumers  in constrained  and consumers  in
unconstrained  importing  countries. Next we look for evidence. In section  11 we rely on trends in
import shares into the EC and US.  We examine  both trends in market shares for aggregate  categories
of textiles  and clothing (T&C)  before and during the MFA.  The trends suggest that through the
successive  rounds of MFA, the growth in the developing  country  share in the US and EC markets
was arrested.  This suggestive  finding motivates  the more detailed microeconomic  examination  of
quota utilization  rates and price differentials  in section IV.  Using recent disaggregated  data on quota
utilization  rates and unit values for EEC imports  under the MFA, we look for evidence  of price
differentials  and, hence, inefficiencies.  Conclusions  follow in section V.
We are awire that by looking  only for evidence  of static losses and inefficiencies,  we are only
looking at one part of the economic  impact  of the MPA. In a more general dynamic context, one
would recognize  that, historically, textiles  and apparel  have played an important  role in the
industrialization  of today's developed countries  and, more recently, in the industrialization  of the
successful  East Asian NICs.3
H.  SOURCES OF ECONOMIC WiEFICIENCY  AND TRANSFERS IN THE MFA:
A THEORETICAL  ANALYSIS
The bilateral quotas negotiated  under the umbrella of the MFA arbitrarily divide up markets and
prevent the normal operation of a market system from efficiently  allocating  resources among  different
activities and locations and efficiently  distributing  goods among consumers  in different countries.
To maximize the output from available  resources, production  of a good must be sllocated  among
producers so that the marginal  cost of production  is equated  across producers. If marginal costs are
not equated  across producers, production  would not be efficient  because  shifting  production from the
higher-ost to lower-cost  producer would decrease  total production  costs. A market system will also
distribute  the goods produced  among consumers  efficiently. Efficient  distribution  of goods ensures
that products go to the individuals  who place the highest  valuation  on them, as evidenced  by their
willingness  to pay to obtain them.  Efficient  allocation  among consumers  will occur in a market
system if all consumers  pay the same price for each good.
For overall efficiency  in production  and consumption,  the marginal  social cost of production  for
producers must equal the price paid for the product by consumers. In a market system, in the
absence  of market power or externalities,  this condition  will hold when all consumers  pay and all
producers receive  the same price for a particular  good.  As shown below, the MFA's quota system
undermines  the market system's ability  to achieve  these efficiency  conditions. The MFA restraints
also result in potentially  large transfers between  groups within countries  and between countries.
The supply constraints  resulting  from the MFA create artificial  scarcities  of the products,
increase  prices in the constrained  markets, and generate  windfall  profits or rents.  These windfall
profits are divided among importers, exporters, producers, or the government,  depending  upon the
way the restraints are administered  and the degree of market power in the relevant markets. In the4
following  discussion, we use a partial equilibrium  framework  to identify  the various sources of
inefficiencies  and transfers inherent in the maze of bilateral quotas that make up the MFA.  We start
with a discussion  of the sources of inefficient  allocation across producers, then turn to a discussion  of
the sources of inefficient  allocation  across consumers.
i.  Ineffident allocation across producers
The quota restrictions reallocate  production  away from lower-cost  suppliers  toward higher-cost
suppliers. These reallocations  take a number  of forms:  reallocations  from constrained  exporting
countries  to domestic suppliers in the protected  import markets; reallocations  among constrained
exporting  countries; reallocations  from constrained  exporting  countries toward unconstrained
countries; and even reallocation  among  individual  firms within a constrained  exporting  country. All
of these reallocations  are potential  sources of inefficiencies  in production  that cause welfare losses
from the quota system.
a.  Reallocations  From Constrained  Exporters  to Domestic Suppliers  and Among Constrained
Exporters
Consider  first reallocations  of production  from constrained  exporting  countries to domestic
suppliers and reallocations  among  constrained  exporting countries. Suppose  that an importing  country
(country 1) imports a product  from two different exporting  countries (countries  2 and 3).  For
simplicity  assume that the products produced  by all three countries are identical  and that the exporting
countries export  only to the one importing  country. Country I also has a domestic  industry that
produces the product. Under free trade, the efficiency  condition  noted above  would hold in the free
market equilibrium, as illustrated  in Figure 1. D,  and S,  are the demand and supply curves,
respectively,  for the product within country 1.  Import demand would be the difference  between5
quantity  demanded  and quantity supplied,  shown by DM. SI and SI are the expon supply curves of
countries  2 and 3, respectively. In the absence  of any export restrictions  on the part of either of these
countries,  the total supply to the importlh.g  country 1 would be S2+3. The market equilibrium  would
be determined  at P*, where supply to the country  equals import demand. That market price would
determine the quantity supplied  to this market by producers in all three countries. If markets in all
three countries  are competitive,  all producers  will be maximizing  profits by  xpanding  output to the
point at which price equals marginal cost, so marginal cost would be equated across both exporters
and the industry  in the importing  country, satisfying  the condition  of efficiency  in production.
In contrast, suppose  country 1 negotiates  export quotas on this product with the exporting
countries. Country 2 agrees  to ship no more than Q2  and country 3 agrees to ship no more than Q 3.
In that case total export supply becomes  vertical at Q2+Q 3, and the market equilibrium  price would
be PQ. At that price, the domestic industry  in 1 would  expand output  to SQ. ihe marginal  cost of
production  in the importing country  would increase  to MC,.  In contrast, as shipments  in country 2
and 3 are reduced, output declines and marginal cost of production  falls to MC 2 and MC 3,
respectively.
In this quota-ridden  equilibrium,  MC,*  MC 2 *  MC 3 and the efficiency  condition  for allocation
of output among  suppliers is violated.  The inefficiency  arises because  the quota  restraints shift
production  from lower-cost  producers in countries  2 and 3 to  higher-cost  producers in country 1.
The difference  between the cost of production  of the extra amount  (SQ-SI)  in country 1 and the cost of
production  in 2 and 3 when production  is efficiently  allocated  between  them can be identified  by
projecting  downward  from point B the mirror image of the supply curve S21 3 starting from point A.
As country l's production displaces  2's and 3's, the deviation  between  the marginal  costs increases.
The total extra production  costs equal to area Cp  are incurred as output expands in the importing
country  and falls in the exporting countries. Additional  losses in the importing  country of C. would6
be incurred  due to consumption  distortions  and of T because  the system  of quota administration  under
the MFA results in transfers to the exporters in the form of rents.
Moreover, with the arbitrarily determined  export quota  system, production  is not allocated
efficiently  between  the exporting  countries. The marginal  cost of production is higher in country 3
than 2, which implies that costs could be decreased  by increasing  production in 2 and decreasing
production in 3.  The size of the loss from misallocation  between  the two exporting courtries can be
identifia by asking by how much  costs would decrease as units of production  shif trom country 3 to
country 2.  As 3 produces one lass unit, costs decline  by the marginal  cost in 3, and costs increase  by
the marginal  cost in 2.  The sum total of the cost differentials  can be shown by sketching in the
mirror image of S2  below S3 in the left-hand  panel.  The vertical distance between S3 and the mirror
image of S2 shows the  costs saved by reallocating  each unit of production  from 3 to 2 until the
marginal  costs are equated. The entire area CA,  shows  the total gain in terms of lowered production
costs that would be achieved  by efficiently  allocating  output  between 2 and 3.'  It represents  the costs
of the arbitrary allocation  of output among  exporting  countries  inherent in the MFA system.
The supply constraints  also cause an artificial scarcity  of the restrained  good in the importing
country  which drives up the price and creates windfall  gains.  Figure 1 illustrates  why this occurs.
The restricted  good will sell in the importing  country for PQ. Suppliers in countries  2 and 3 would
have been willing  to supply  the restricted  quantity at a price equal to MC 2 and MC 3, respectively.
The divergence  between  the price at which exporters  would  be willing  to supply their quota
allocations  and the sales price of the good in the importing  country  implies windfall  gains (termed
quota rents).  These gains will be divided among exporters, importers,  or governments,  depending
upon how the quotas are administered  and the relative market power of importers and exporters. 27
b.  Reallocations  from Constralned  Exporting  Countries  toward Unconstrained  Exporting Countries
The discriminatory  nature of the MFA system, in which some countries exporting  to a particular
market are constrained  but others remain unconstrained  also leads to inefficiencies  in production.
Production  will tend to be reallocated  away from constrained  exporting countries  toward
unconstrained  exporters.'  This phenomenon  is illustrated  in Figure 2.  Assume  that there are two
exporting  countries, 1 and 2, exporting  identical  products to an importing  country. D is the import
demand curve. and SI and S2 the export supply curves of the competitive  industries  in 1 and 2.  In the
absence  of any quota arrangements,  the market equilibrium  price P* would be determined  by the
interaction  of total supply (SI +  S 2) with import demand. The quantities  exported  by 1 and 2 would
be X, and X2, respectively. Each exporting  country  is operating along its supply curve at P*, so the
marginal  cost of production  would be equal in the industries  of both exporting countries.
Suppose,  however, that the importing  country were to negotiate  an export quota arrangement
with exporting  country 2 that limits its shipments  to Q 2. The supply curve of country  2 would
become  vertical at the export quota ceiling, the total supply to the importing  country would shift to
S,+SV, and the market equilibrium  price would increase  to PQ. Given this higher equilibrium  price,
exports from unconstrained  exporter 1 would increase to X?, replacing  in part the decline in exports
from constrained  country 2.  This reallocation  creates inefficiencies,  however, because the location  of
production  has shifted from the lower-cost  to the higher-cost  supplier. As before, the extent of this
inefficiency  can be measured  by asking what would be the cost savings if the extra output produced
by 1 were produced  by 2 instead. Starting  from the quota-distorted  equilibrium,  if one less unit were
produced  by 1 the reduction  in cost would  be MC,.  If one more unit were produced  by 2, costs
would increase by MC 2. The net aecrease in costs for that one unit would be MC, less MC 2, and so
on as units of production shifted  from 1 to 2.  The production  cost savings  from allowing country  2
to produce all of the extra units produced by 1 would be the shaded area C. in Figure 2.  This area is8
derived by projecting  the mirror image of country  2's supply curve (which reflects its lower marginal
cost) from point A (country l's  quota-distorted  production  level) and noting the difference  between
the two countries' marginal  cost of production  as country l's  production is replaced  by country 2's.
The rectangular  area T is a transfer to country l's  exporters  and C. is the loss due to the consumptior.
distortion.
c. Inefficienat  Allocation among  Firms  in Constrained  Exporting Countries
Yet another source of inefficient  allocation  in production  associated  with the MFA arrangements
is the potential  for inefficient  allocation  of output among  exporting firms within a single constrained
exporting  country. This possibility  arises because  the exporting  countries  have to adopt some
procedure  to limit exports, which virtually  always takes the form of an export licensing  system. The
methods  of administering  these systems  vary across countries, but most systems  allocate licenses
based on criteria other than which firms can produce  the product at lowest cost at that particular  point
in time.  MoSL  importantly,  they often do not allow transfer among firms.'  Constraints  on the
transferability  of licenses among firms is another source of inefficiency  in the MPA.
To illustrate  the problem, suppose  that two firms in a constrained  exporting country  are
producing  identical  goods.  The supply curves of these two firms are shown as SA  and SB  in Figure 3.
If the quota limit for the constrained  exporting  country is Q, the efficient allocation  of this output
between  the two firms would be where the marginal  cost of production  is equated  across firms.
Given  that for competitive  firms each firm's supply curve is its marginal  cost curve, the efficient
allocation  of production  between  the two firms would  be at output levels XA  and XB.
Suppose  that quotas are originally  allocated  at these levels, but firm B is able, say through new
investment,  to improve its productivity  and lower production  costs so that its supply curve shifts
downward  to Sh'. If the quota constraint  for the country  remains at Q, then the efficient allocation  of9
exports between  the firms would be XA' and XB'. But if quotas are allocated  by historical
performance,  both firms would receive the same quotas as before.  Firm A would produce XA-XA'
"too much" and firm B would produce  X0'-XB  "too little". The cost of this misallocation  can be
identified  by asking how much costs would  decrease if production  were reallocated  to the most
efficient levels. If firm A were to decrease  its output  by one unit costs would decrease by MCA,  and
if firm B were to increase its output by one unit costs would increase by the height of S.' at point A.
The cost savings would be equal to the difference  between  these. As additional  units of output were
shifted  from A to B the gain from each unit shifted  would be the difference  between the marginal  cost
of production  in the two firms.  As in the previous case of the arbitrary allocation among  exporting
wountries,  the total gain from reallocating  to the most efficient  allocation  can be depicted  by projecting
the mirror image of the segment  AB along SB'  from XA'  under SA, am  shown by the dotted line.  Area
C, represents  the total cost saving from reallocating  XA-XA'  (=XB'-XB  ) units of production  from A to
B.
ii.  Inefficient allocation among importing countries
The bilateral quota arrangements  arbitrarily  divide and separate markets, which allows consumer
prices for the same good to differ between  markets. This segmentation  will lead to an inefficient
allocation  of goods between  consume-s. The inefficient  allocation  among consumers  takes two forms:
reallocations  among consumers  located in different constrained  importing  countries, and reallocations
from consumers  in constrained  importing  countries  toward consumers in importing countries  that have
not negotiated  or imposed  any restrictions.10
a.  Reallocations  among consumers  in constrained  importing  countries
To illustrate  the source of this inefficiency,  suppose  that two importing  countries are importing
an identical  product from an exporting county, where the good can be purchased  at price P*.  The
import demand  curves for these two countries  are DI and D2, respectively,  in Figure 4.  Suppose  that
the importing  countries negotiate  export restraints with the exporting  country that limit exports to 1 to
Q, and exports to 2 to Q2. The supply curves to the importing  countries would become vertical at the
quota  limits, as shown by S? and S?, respectively. The equilibrium  price in country 1 would be P?,
and in country 2 P2.
The divergence  in the price of the restricted  good in the two markets reveals a potential gain
from shifting  supply from the low-price  to the high-price  market.  If the markets were not segmented,
as for example  if only one export quota with the same total exports applied to them both, then the
equilibrium  would  be determined  at point A, where total demand and supply intersect, and the
common  price in both markets  would be Pc.5
Starting from the segmented-market  equilibrium,  if one more unit were allocated  to country  2,
the height of D 2 at E shows the willingness  of the marginal  consumer  to pay for the good, or in other
words, the value of that unit to a consumer  in country  2.  If one less unit were shipped  to country 1,
the height of DI at point D shows the value of that unit to the marginal  consumer  in country 1.  The
difference  between  the values of the goods to the marginal  consumers  in both countries  across the
total amount  that would be shifted if there were a single  market can be identified  by projecting  the
mirror image of the segment  DF of D, upward from point B, as shown by the dashed line BC.  The
vertical distance between  12 and the dashed  line shows  the net gain from reallocating  each unit from
country 1 to country 2, as would automatically  take place in the absence  of separate quotas. Thus the
shaded area Cs can be interpreted  as the cost of the arbitrary segmentation  of import  markets inherent
in the MFA system.11
b.  Reallocation  from constrained  to unconstrained  biporters
A quota on exports to one importing  country  when the exporters  are also exporting  to other
countries  will tend to divert exports toward the unconstrained  importing  countries and cause a
divergence  in price between  constrained  and unconstrained  importers. 6 Figure 5 shows import
demand curves for two importing  countries 1 and 2, and the export supply curve of the exporting
country. In the absence of any restraints, the market equilibrium  would be determined  by the
intersection  of supply with total demand, DT,  which is the horizontal  sum of D, and D2. Price would
be P*, country 1 would import M, and country 2, M2. If importing  country  2 negotiates  an export
restraint with the exporting  country with a ceiling at Q2, the supply to country 2 would become
vertical at this ceiling and price within country  2 would rise to P2. The restraint on shipments  to
country  2 will affect supply  to country 1.  Once exports to 2 are constrained,  the supply curve facing
country 1 would  be the amount supplied  along  the supply curve S less the amount shipped to country
2 (Q2).  This residual supply curve is shown by S1. The market equilibrium  price in country 1 would
fall to P,.
The difference in price in the two markets indicates  an inefficient  distribution  of the product
across consumers. A net welfare gain could  be achieved  by shifting  sales from country 1 to country
2.  On the margin, if the total amount  exported  to the two countries  remained  the same as under the
restraint but one more unit were sold in country 2, the value of that unit to a consumer  is shown by
the height of the demand curve, or, in this case, P2. If one less unit were sold in country 1, the value
of the that last unit sold to a consumer  would be P,.  There would be a net gain equal to (P2-P 1) if
one unit were reallocated  from 1 to 2.  The total gain from shifting  the extra units consumed  in 1
(=MQ-M,)  as a result of the constraint  back to country 2 would be the shaded area C 3. This area is
derived in the same manner as C 8 in Figure 4, by projecting  the mirror image of D, under D2  and12
assessing  the difference  in the heights  of the two demand curves.  Gains equal to areas labeled C,
also would arise if total production  and exports increased  back to the free-trade  level.
Figure 5 also serves to illustrate  some of the transfers caused  by the MFA.  When the restraint
drives up price in country  2, exporters  earn rents of R 2 on sales to 2.  Compared  with the freettrade
equilibrium,  exporters lose area RI plus the lower triangle labeled Cp  on sales to 1 where the price
has fallen.  Consumers  in 2 suffer a loss of consumer  surplus equal to area abcd, while consumers in
1 gain defg from the drop in price.
III.  Global Trends in Textile and Clothing Trade
i.  Milestones in Restrictions
Just as the textile industry  played a key role in the industrialization  of today's developed
countries in the 19th century, it was an engine of industrialization  - along with other light
manufactures  such as footwear  and leather  products - for Japan between  the two world wars, 7 then
for the successful  East Asian NICs since the early sixties. Until then, the main source of competition
for developed-country  textile and apparel  producers were cotton textiles  from Japan.  Then during the
sixties, several developing  countries  emerged  as important  exporters. This is what one would expect
from the factor endowment  theory of international  trade since at that time communications  improved
and new technology  spread rapidly while  transport costs fell.  Trade in clothing increased dramatically
and synthetic  fibres captured a growing  share of the world fibre market.  With the introduction  of
labor-saving  technology  in spinning  and weaving,  differences in comparative  costs between  developed
and developing  countries narrowed in textiles. The main challenge  was no longer cotton textile
exports from Japan:  it became  clothing and exports from developing  countries.13
The stepping  stones to the MFA were the Short-Term  and Long-Term  Arrangements  Regarding
Trade in Textiles  which regulated  trade starting in late 1961 until pressures  to "legitimize"  these
departures from GATr rules (disregard  of the non-discrimination  rule and the prohibition  on the use
of quantitative  restrictions)  led to the negotiation  of MWA I which entered into force in January 1974.
With MFA I, these "special  rules" were extended to wool and man-made  textiles and clothing, in
addition  to cotton products.  A tightening  of rules and restrictions  occurred with MFA II (1978),
MFA III (1982) and MFA IV (1986).  Each time coverage increased  with more countries and more
products  At the same time, complex rules to introduce  some flexibility  (e.g. swing provisions
introduced  under MFA I) but not too much  (e.g. the "anti-surge' provision requested  by the EC
during the negotiations  of MFA III) were adopted  in the successive  renewals  of the MFA.  Rules have
become so complicated  with so many exceptions  and have been modified  so many times that it is
difficult  to know where we stand.  In the following  we look for evidence  of broad trends.
ii.  Trends in Textile and Clothing Trade
Our first look for sources of inefficiency  is an inspection  of import trends in the EC and US for
textiles and clothing. Figure 6 presents data on the LDC share of US and EC imports  in three
product categories: (1) fibres; (2) yarns and fabrics; and (3) clothing for the years 1964 through
1990.  We treat the EC symmetrically  with the US, by subtracting  intra-EC imports from total EC
imports.
It is useful to examine  the trends by considering  separately  restrictions  on textile inputs (fibres,
yarns and fabrics)  and on final goods (clothing)  since restraints shifted  from textiles  towards clothing
and, as is known  from effective  protection  theory, protection  of industries  supplying  inputs is
effectively  a tax on the corresponding  final good industry. Also, as a first approximation,  it is useful
to think of textiles  and clothing as a mature industry so that, technology  should presumably  be the14
same in the US and EC.  If, in addition, one also assumes "similar"  factor costs in the EC and US,
then differences in import shares (neglecting  differences  in product mix due to differences in income
and tastes) would be largely attributable  to differences  in protection.
On the input side, figure 6 shows a clear shift away from imports of fibres from the LDC on the
part of both the EC and US suggesting  that the measures  caused  some allocative  inefficiency. In the
EC case, diversion was towards intra-EC  trade as the share of other developed country imports (the
difference  between  DC to EEC and EEC to EEC) remained  relatively  constant at 40 percent
throughout  the period.  On the other hand, imports  of yarns and fabrics from developing  countries
for the EC remained  fairly constant  with little impact  from the restrictions, at least up until MFA IV
at which point, the import share of developing  countries  starts to fall.  In the case of the US,
however, figure 6 strongly suggests  that MFA I (and its successors)  effectively  arrested the rising
developing  country share of imports  of yarns and fabrics.
Turning  to clothing, several interesting  patterns emerge. The trends in the LDC shares of US
and EC clothing imports is roughly similar.  LDC shares were growing in both markets until the mid-
1970s,  when the growth was arrested or diminished. It took successive  MFA rounds for both the EC
and the US to slow the growing share of developing  countries.  For the EC, the LDC import share
started from a higher base in 1964, and leveled  off at a somewhat  lower level.  The increase in the
LDC share of US clothing imports was much more marked than in the EC.  In both the US and the
EC, LDC import shares in clothing  have stabilized  in the last decade.
Broadly  speaking,  the trends in figure 6 suggest  that the successive  negotiations  under the MFA
had some restraining  effect on the shift in comparative  advantage  towards developing  countries.
Import shares of developing  countries stabilized  in clothing and stabilized  or declined  in textiles.
Given some restoration in comparative  advantage  for developed  countries in textiles through the15
development  of labor-saving  technology,  the restraining effect of the MFA is likely to have been
strongest for clothing.
The evidence  on market shares indicates  that the growth in the developing-country  share of US
and EC import markets for textiles and clothing (T&C)  that had been occurring before 1974 was
slowed  or stopped  by successive  MFA.  This suggests  that the MFA has caused a reallocation  of
production  from developing  countries  toward developed-country  producers as described  in section  1I,
with the attendant  production  inefficiencies.
We also inspected  import  trends (for the same breakdown  as in table 6) for Australia and New
Zealand, two countries  that did not participate  in the MFA, but instead applied gle'al  QRs. 8 The
pattern of LDC import shares in fibres, yarns and textiles, and clothing, shown in figure 7, are
broadly similar to those for the US and EC.  The similarity  in the evolution  of LDC shares of imports
in these categories  weakens any conclusion  that the evolution  in the US and the EC was due to the
more discriminatory  nature of the MFA, because similar patterns emerge for Australia  and New
Zealand, both of which had systems that ostensibly  were nondiscriminatory.
The second production  inefficiency  identified  in section  II arose from the reallocation  of
production  from constrained  to unconstrained  suppliers. Here, we provide some illustrative  evidence
about such shifts using the example  of Italy.  Italy has, within  the OECD countries, a comparative
advantage  in the production  of T&C and therefore will be most likely to benefit from a discriminatory
trade policy which restricts only imports  coming from developing  countries. Within the EC, Italy can
be thought  of as a representative  domestic producer. With respect to the US, Italy can be thought  of
as a rep:esentative  unconstrained  exporter. The predictions  of reallocations  of production  from
constrained  suppliers toward domestic suppliers  and unconstrained  exporters  are largely borne out by
existing _,idence. Data on trade flows show that Italy's share in T&C imports of OECD countries
suffered a steady erosion during the sixties. In the EC, for instance, Italy's export share fell from16
21.3 percent in 1963  to 17.2 percent in 1973  for clothing and from 11.1 percent of 10.1 percent for
textiles. Similarly, in the US, Italian exporters  of textiles  lost some ground with their market share
falling by almost  one percentage  point over the period. The decline was halted and even reversed
after 1973  when MFA I was put in place.  The figures are revealing. From 1973  to 1986 textile
exports from Italy increased from 6.3 percent of total US imports  of textiles to 8.6 percent.  For the
EC, over the same p%.Aod,  the Italian share of textile imports increased  from 10.1 percent to 13.3
percent.  For clothing, Italian  exports gained almost  2 percentage  points of the EC import markets
and reached 18.8 percent in 1986. The trend continued  well into the 1980s. Despite  shifting
comparative  advantage,  Italian exporters  held their position  in G-7 total imports  of T&C (see table 1).
Admittedly,  these figures are only suggestive  and do not allow us to conclude  that the strong
performance  of Italian exports can be predicated  on cGo  lt;rAing  protection  in OECD countries against
LDCs imports. They suggest however  that this hypothesis  cannot be lightly dismissed. In particular,
the fact that the recovery of Italian T&C exports virtually coincided  with the implementation  of the
MFA restrictions  is quite striking. Further evidence  on the distortionary  effects of MFA protection
comes  from an analysis  of investment  flows. For Italy, the T&C share of gross fixed investment
which was equal to 9 percent in 1967  fell to 5.3 percent in 1971. It then steadily  recovered to reach
almost 8 percent in 1976 and stayed  unchanged  until the end of the decade. On the contrary, in most
other European countries, the investment  trend was unambiguously  negative. This evolution  of
investment  in T&C suggests  that the MFA attracted a significant  amount  of resources into the Italian
T&C sector and, together with the trends in market shares in G-7, suggests  that the MFA caused a
reallocation  of production from constrained  to unconstrained  suppliers.17
IV.  Evidence on Inefriciencies from the MFA in the EC 9
We now turn to the question  of inefficient  allocation  among consumers. To do so we focus on
possible inefficiencies  from quota allocations  among  EC countries. The system of restrictions  applied
by EC countries  under the umbrella  of the MFA provides one of the most revealing examples  of the
potential  inefficiencies  associated  with trade protection  against  T&C imports. The EC commission
negotiates  the MFA restrictions with exporting  countries,  and sets separate quotas for each EC
importing  country. To prevent transhipments  of restricted  items across European markets, EC
countries  can appeal to article 115 of the Rome  Treaty.  This intricate array of restrictions  is designed
to segment  the import markets for imported  T&C across Europe.
To examine  the evidence  on inefficient  allocation  of imported  textile and apparel products within
the EC we use a data set developed from EC MFA quota levels published  in the Official Journal of
the EC and trade data from the EC Bureau  of Statistics. The data includes  shipments,  unit values,
and bilateral quota  utilization  rates for 10 EC countries,  27 exporting countries and 92 product
categories.' 0 For the purposes  of this paper, we concentrate,  however, on the eleven most important
MFA product categories  (in terms of shipments)  and, unless otherwise  indicated, on the three most
important  exporters of each product.
We start with an examination  of the distribution  of import quotas across EC countries  for 1987.
(The  distribution shows very little variation  from year-to-year). As with the other data on utilization
rates and unit values to be discussed  later on, the quota  distributions  in table 2 show great variation
across importing  countries. For example,  France gets 20 percent of the T-shirt quota allocation,  but
only 7 percent of the M&B shirt allocation. Also, even if one leaves aside the newcomers  (Greece,
Portugal and Spain) which have relatively  small allocations,  there is much variation in the average
allocation  across countries. Taking each country's share in EC GNP as a proxy for a "normal"  quota18
allocation,  one sees that Germany  has an allocation  that is 12.4 percentage  points above its GNP
share, while France and Italy have allocation shares below their GNP shares (by 9.4 and 6.5
percentage  points respectively). The shares in table 2 have a larger standird deviation for clothing
than for textiles (yarn and fabrics), reflecting  perhaps greater differences  in demand conditions  across
countries  for clothing. Unfortunately,  from these data one cannot infer to what extent these
allocations  represent the demands  for protection  on the part of domestic import-competing  producers.
However, the relatively large variation in quota distributions  across products within a country, and
across countries,  suggest that this may well be the case.
Consider next in table 3 the average unit values and utilization  rates for these eleven products
over the period 1985-89. At first glance, these unweighted  average figures suggest  relatively high
utilization  rates since only two product categories  have average utilization  rates below 70 percent
across exporters. For most products there is  a relatively close correlation  between average utilization
rates among exporters  and importers."' The data also suggest  that overshipment  is greatest for the
most important  (in the sense of value shares in total shipments)  product categories. Also the
percentage  of quotas with utilization  rates above 80 percent - a rough cut-off for full quota  utilization
- rose from 42 percent in 1985  to 54 percent by 1987 and then stabilized  at 48 percent in 1988  and
1989.12  Prima facie, the data would suggest that EC quotas were "quite" binding and that the
sources of inefficiency  identified  in section 2 could be important.
The "bindingness"  of the quotas in particular  product categories  also appears to be relatively
stable  over time.  Figure 8 plots for each year the percent of all "fully  utilized"  quotas (greater than
80% utilization)  attributable  to each one of the 11  product categories. If the "bindingness"  of quotas
were evenly distributed  across products, each product should account  for approximately  9% of all of
the binding  quotas. Figure 8 reveals differences across  products in the frequency  with which quotas
are fully utilized. Jerseys (category  5) and men and boys shirts (category 8) account for the most19
fully utilized quotas, while women dresses (category  26) accounts  for the smallest proportion of fully
utilized  quotas.  The plot shows a great stability  over time.  Products which account for a large
proportion  of the binding quotas in a particular  year also make up a large proportion  of the binding
quotas in successive  years.
Figure 9 presents evidence  on the utilization  of quota  across exporters. To see whether the
binding quotas occur disproportionately  among  larger and more established  exporters, or among new
emerging  suppliers, we split the group of 27 exporters  into two categories. In one category, Brazil,
China, Hong Kong, India, Korea, Malaysia,  Taiwan, Thailand  and Yugoslavia  are treated
individually. All 18 remaining  countries  are lumped  together in an "other" category.  Under this
breakdown, an even distribution  of binding quotas across exporters  would imply that the countries
identified  individually  should each account  for 3.7 percent of the occurrences  of "binding"  quotas,
while  those in the "other" category should globally  account for 66.6 percent of the occurrences.
Figure 9 shows that Korea, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Thailand  account for disproportionately
large shares of the binding quotas. The pattern of the distribution  of the fully utilized quotas is also
stable over time.
Figure 10 shows that high quota utilization  rates are also consistently  concentrated  in the same
group of importing  countries within  the EC:  Benelux,  Germany  and the United Kingdom. Portugal,
Greece and Spain, who recently  joined the EC, only account  for between  2 and 4 percent of the
quotas that are fully utilized.
The analysis  in section II indicated  that inefficiencies  due to misallocation  of products among
consumers  arise from price divergences  in the separate import markets  due to the separate quota
restrictions  on each market.  There is little agreement,  however, in the empirical  literature as to the
extent of market segmentation  and the significance  of price differentials  in textiles and apparel across
EC importing  countries. The importance  of this issue lies in the fact that the completion  of the20
internal  market means  that national  markets will no longer will be segmented, and underutilized  quota
for importing  jerseys from Hong Kong in one EC member country could  be used to import more into
another  member country  where the Hong Kong  jersey quota had been binding.
The Cecchini  report (1988)  argues that there is no evidence  of substantial  barriers in T&C trade
among  EC countries. This leads the authors of the report to predict that the completion  of the unified
market will not have much of an impact  in terms of trade creation  for this sector. Further evidence
(and a theoretical  rationale) in support of this conclusion,  comes from Hamilton (1991). He argues
that because the EC countries produce  domestically  very close substitutes  for the restricted imports,
and trade in domestically  produced  products is not restricted, effective  market segmentation,  and
therefore price differentials  across countries, will not occur.  Indeed, free trade in EC- produced
commodities  will harmonize  prices across EC markets. As supporting evidence,  Hamilton shows  that
over the period 1982-89,  estimated  import-tariff  equivalents  to Hongkong  T&C quotas did not differ
significantly  across the main EC markets, suggesting  that, in the absence  of intra-EC barriers, import
prices within the EC were already largely equalized. Under these conditions,  then, the costs of the
MFA would only depend  on the aggregate  (EC) level of the quota and not on its distribution  among
the different domestic markets.
There are several reasons, however, to treat these previous conclusions  with some caution.
First, while Hamilton's (1991)  data show that the average over the period 1980-89  of import-tariff-
equivalents  of Hong Kong VERs were not substantially  different across EC markets, the data show
greater variation within individual  years." 3 Second, the importing country  markets examined  by
Hamilton included  West Germany,  France, the UK, Denmark, and Italy.  A glance at Figure 10
reveals that these are 4 of the 5 import markets  with the greatest percentage  of fully utilized quotas.
Including  the countries  with lower quota  utilization  rates may increase  the dispersion  of tariff
equivalents. Third, the existence  of EC substitutes  may not be sufficient  to equalize  prices across EC21
markets  provided  that there are still substantial  intra-EC  barriers to trade.  While the effects of these
barriers are distinct from the ones of article 115, it could  nonetheless  be argued that they would  be
much  harder to enforce if, in the absence  of article 115, developing  countries  T&C imports were free
to circulate within  the EC.  And fourth, the conclusion  that article 115 is not an effective  tool to
segment  the European market of T&C seems inconsistent  with the fact that article-1  15-based  requests
to prevent free circulation  of goods within  the EC are made mostly in connection  with trade in T&C
(Sapir, 1990).
It is possible to bring more direct evidence  to bear on this issue.  One interesting  piece of
evidence  comes  from an analysis  of trade prices from both developed and developing  countries
exports to the main EC markets. Faini and Heimler (1990)  show that, even after controlling  for
compositional  differences," 4 significant  price disparities  across importing  markets can be observed.
More crucially, for clothing  exports, the variability  of prices is much larger for developing  than for
developed  countries exports (Table 4).  This would appear to suggest  that national MFA restraints  are
effective  in segmenting  the different EC markets. Either because  of product differentiation  or because
of intra-EC barriers to trade in close import substitutes,  intra-EC trade is not sufficient  to equalize  the
price of foreign imports, accounting  therefore for the wide recourse to article 115. This conjecture  is
further supported  by the fact that utilization  rates of MFA quotas show a wide dispersion across EC
import  markets, suggesting  a potential for reallocation  from unconstrained  toward constrained  markets
[Faini, de Melo and Takacs (1992)]. Some further evidence  in this respect comes  from an analysis  of
the quota  utilization  rates for Korea, China and Hongkong  (Table 5).  Again, the table indicates  that
existing quotas are apparently  binding in some markets and significantly  underutilized  in others.
What is perhaps more interesting  is the fact that the coefficients  of variation  for prices and utilization
rates are significantly  and positively correlated. The regression coefficient  is equal to .51 for clothing
and to .26 for textiles and in both cases is highly significant  (with t-statistics  of 13.3 and 3.922
respectively). This result seems to indicate  that differences  in prices are related to the degree of
"bindingness"  of trade restraints, where the latter is measured  by the utilization  rate.  Notice that, if
we control for (exporting)  country  factors through a fixed effect specification,  we still find a
significant  correlation  between  the variability  of prices and of utilization  rates for clothing (with a
coefficient  of .46 and a t-statistic  of 5.4), but the relationship  ceases to be significant  for textiles.
This finding  seems to uphold the view that trade restrictions  are much  less binding  for textvles  than
for clothing, a conjecture  which finds further support in the much lower dispersion of textile prices
across EC markets (Table 4).
It would be also interesting  to know whether  the level, rather than the variability, of prices and
utilization  rates are significantly  correlated. We could then infer for instance whether prices will be
higher in relatively more controlled  markets. Short of a fully-specified  model of trade flows and
restrictions, we look at the simple correlation  between  these two variables for exports from China,
Hongkong  and Korea to the main EC markets (Germany,  Italy, France and the U.K.).  Again, prices
are measured  by quality corrected  unit value indices. Graphical  examination  suggests, and statistical
analysis  confinrs, the existence  of a non-linear  relationship  (Table 6).  For low values of the
utilization  rate, prices and utilization  rates are negatively  correlated, suggesting  perhaps that we are
moving  along the demand curve.  The turning point occurs at a utilization  rate slightly above 100
percent.  This can be taken as an indication  that, above this critical level, the quotas become binding
and a tightening  of the quota itself will be associated  with a higher import price.  Once again, it
seems clear that import prices within the EC depend  on the trade policy stance with equalizing
tendencies,  at best, quite weak.23
V.  Conclusions
This paper has attempted  to identify  the various distortions, sources  of inefficiency,  and transfers
among  groups that are created by the bilateral export quotas negotiated  under the framework  of the
MFA.  The MFA causes inefficient  allocation  of production  activities  between  exporters in restrained
countries  and producers in the protected import markets, between  various constrained  exporters, and
between constrained  and unconstrained  exporters. The restraints also cause inefficient  allocation  of
the constrained  product between  consumers  in different protected importing  country  markets, and
between consumers  in constrained  and unconstrained  importing  countries. In addition  to these
inefficiencies,  potentially  large transfers occur from importing  countries  to exporting  countries, and
from constrained  to unconstrained  importing  countries, and toward unconstrained  exporters.
Evidence  from data on market shares of developing  and developed  country exporters  of fibers,
textiles  and apparel, indicate  that the MFA succeeded in arresting  the growth in the LDC share of
textile and apparel imports into the EC and the US.  Evidence  on Italian market shares in the EC and
US textile and clothing .mport markets indicates  that there was also the expected  shift from
constrained  exporters  to domestic  producers and from constrained  exporters  to unconstrained
exporters.
Investigation  of quota utilization  rates, and unit values across product categories  and countries
for the EC MFA restrictions  indicates  that there appears  to be market segmentation  within Europe in
textile and clothing  products.  EC quotas tend to be binding  and the 'bindingness' of the quotas
appears to be relatively stable over time across products, importing  countries, and exporting
countries. Significant  price disparities across importing  markets can be observed.  Coefficients  of
variation  for prices and utilization  rates are significantly  and positively  correlated, indicating  that
differences  in prices are related to the "bindingness"  of trade restraints. These findings point to the24
existence  of market segmentation  and price differentials,  which imply inefficiencies  in allocation
across consumers.25
ENDNOTES
1.  In deriving CA note that inefficieint  allocation  occurs when country 3 supplies beyond g which is
the marginal  cost of the last unit supplied  by 2 under the constra.nt.
2.  Suppose, for example,  that importing  is conducted  by a large number  of competitive  importers
and quota control is exercised in exporting  countries  by distributing licenses  to exporters. In that case
the market between exporters  and importers  will clear at PQ  and for each unit exported rents equal to
the difference  between  the price at which exporters  would be willing  to supply the product and PQ
would accrue to the exporters. Total rents to exporters  in 2 would be area abfe and in 3, abdc. In an
empirical study  of the distribution  of MFA quota rents between Hong Kong exporters and U. S.
importers, Erzan, Krishna, and Tan (1991)  find rents to be divided approximately  equally, which
indicates  that importers in the US probably  exert some monopsony  power.
3.  This is one of the sources  of the nonequivalence  of export restraints  and import quotas. See
Takacs (1978).
4.  Hong Kong allocates export licenses  on the basis of past performance,  but allows a market for
transfer among exporters  (Hamilton, 1986b). The main criterion used by Korea is a firm's export
volume  in the previous year, but some quota is allocated  on the basis of the previous year's average
export  price and/or volume of exports to unrestricted  countries  (Bark and de Melo, 1988). In the
ASEAN  countries (Indonesia,  Malaysia,  the Philippines,  Singapore, Thailand)  free trading of export
licenses  is not allowed. In these countries  also the allocations  are based primarily  on past export
performance.  Firms that do not fill at least a stated percentage  of the quota received  will face reduced
quota allocations  in future periods (Hamilton, 1986a).
5.  The abolishment  of article 112 under the Treaty of Rome which is to take place January 1, 1993
will eliminate  this kind of market segmentation  within  the EC.  See Faini, de Melo and Takacs
(1992).
6.  This spillover  effect is a major reason for what Hamilton (1989) calls the "domino"  effect which
has been observed under bilaterally  negotiated  trade restraints.
7.  It is interesting  that VERs in textiles  have a long history: as early as 1936  Japan agreed  to
restrain its exports of textiles  to the United States.
8.  Australia initially  participated  in the MFA, but switched  to global tariff-quotas  in 1975.
9.  The evidence in this section draws on data assembled  in previous work in Faini and Heimler
(1990)  and Faini, de Melo and Takacs (1992).
10.  The data set which was constructed  from data on EC MFA quota levels  published  in the official
Journal of the EC and trade data from the EC Bureau  of Statistics is further presented in Faini, de
Melo and Takacs (1992).
11. The only two exceptions  are woven coats and women dresses.  Utilization  rates are twice as high26
for exporters  than for importers. (ne  average utilization  rates can differ between importers and
exporters  because  the calculations  on the export side are based only on the three largest exporters).
12.  Except for 1985, there is also a negative  (but statistically  insignificant)  negative  correlation
between  the quota  share attributed  to an importer and its quota utilization  rate.
13.  The tariff equivalents  across major EC import markets within a given year differed by from 2 to
13 percentage  points.  The percentage  difference  (highest-lowest)/highest  ranged from 13 to 66
percent.
14.  In the empirical trade literature, studies of price differentials  typically  rely on unit value indices
and suffer therefore from the severe problems  of comparability  that beset, at an aggregate  level, such
measures.27
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Table 1
Italy's market share In G-7 Imports of T&C
Year  Textiles  Clothing
1982  12.0  12.2
1983  12.5  11.8
1984  12.1  11.0
1985  12.1  11.4
1986  12.2  12.3
1987  11.7  11.4
1988  12.0  10.3
1989  12.0  9.5
1990  12.5  10.3
Source: Instituto  per il Commercio  Estero, 1991.30
Table 2:  Quota Distributions Across  EC Importing Countries (1987)
(share of total EC quota)
Category  BNL  D  DK  E  F  GR  I  IRL  P  UK  St. deviation
1.  Cotton yarn  13.8  31.5  2.2  2.2  10.1  1.1  26.7  3.2  5.9  3.3  10.87
2.  Woven  cotton fabrics  9.7  20.7  4.1  0.8  11.9  1.1  15.2  2.0  0.1  34.4  11.06
3.  Woven  synthetic  fabric  14.2  24.8  3.9  0.7  11.3  1.3  20.6  1.2  0.1  21.9  9.83
4.  T-shirts  10.4  32.0  3.1  0.5  20.2  0.1  8.0  0.4  0.0  25.3  11.80
5.  Jerseys  14.8  34.6  2.5  0.3  9.8  0.1  6.2  0.5  0.2  31.0  13.00
6.  M&B trousers  11.5  43.2  3.5  0.7  9.4  0.3  6.8  0.3  0.1  24.2  13.88
7.  Women  blouses  11.3  43.4  2.5  0.5  10.4  0.2  5.4  0.3  0.1  25.9  14.28
8.  M&B  shirts  12.6  45.2  3.2  0.6  7.3  0.1  7.4  0.4  0.1  23.1  14.36
15.  W&G woven coats  9.8  53.6  2.9  0.9  8.9  0.0  5.8  0.4  0.0  17.7  17.52
21.  Parkas, anoraks  10.2  44.6  3.8  1.5  10.4  0.3  6.9  0.3  0.1  21.9  13.92
26.  Women  dresses  11.4  41.3  2.8  1.3  13.1  0.2  7.9  0.3  0.1  21.6  13.11
Average  allocation  11.8  37.7  3.1  0.9  11.2  0.4  10.6  0.9  0.6  22.8 (Standard  deviation)  (1.80)  (9.82)  (0.63)  (0.57)  (3.37)  (0.47)  (7.07)  (0.94)  (1.85)  (7.92)
Share  of EC GNP  8.4  25.3  2.2  6.7  20.6  1.2  17.1  0.6  0.8  17.231
Table 3:  MFA Shipments and Utilization Rates in the EC:  1985489
Categories  Averagc  utilization  Average  utilization  Share of value  Average  unit
rate among exporters  rate among importers  of shipments  value
in totalb
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
1.  Cotton  yarn  70.33  101.56  3.38  3.24
2.  Woven  cotton fabrics  75.64  88.35  10.91  3.95
3.  Woven synthetic  fabrics  64.49  96.15  4.22  4.67
4.  T-shirts  82.04  89.68  8.51  14.21
5.  Jerseys  119.66  113.13  15.48  19.78
6.  M&B Trousers  109.02  66.75  15.44  14.32
7.  Women  Blouses  84.50  79.82  8.79  26.69
8.  M&B Shirts  108.40  89.88  13.31  18.74
15.  Women  woven  coats  49.23  19.95  4.10  27.65
21.  Parkas, Anoraks  169.24  135.13  13.23  20.29
26.  Women  dresses  87.25  45.85  2.62  23.93
a.  Unweighted  averages  over time.
b.  Percentage  share.32
Table 4
Average coefficient of variation for import prices on the major EC markets:  1982-87
Exporting  country  Textiles  Clothing
France  26.7  13.0
Germany  25.1  20.1
United  Kingdom  24.1  12.7
China  16.6  82.0
Korea  7.7  43.8
Hongkong  10.8  67.7
EFTA  18.3  13.3
USA, Canada  25.2  21.8
Japan  35.9  21.2
Yugoslavia,  Turkey  33.2  45.6
Latin America  29.0  25.2
Southeast  Asia  13.9  24.9
Middle  East  27.1  35.5
South Asia  34.1  25.133
Table 5
Quota utilization rates for major T&C exporters
a)  Clothing
China  Hongkong  Korea
1985  1989  1985  1989  1985  1989
Germany  89.9  116.8  72.8  92.14  108.3  61.35
France  79.0  67.66  66.61  87.37  99.29  72.72
Italy  66.81  38.93  38.12  46.28  49.22  31.13
United  Kingdom  84.15  105.6  80.62  117.7  84.19  81.02
b)  Textiles
China  Hongkong  Korea
1985  1989  1985  1989  1985  1989
Germany  91.36  60.75  15.98  18.25  85.10  70.96
France  88.94  71.40  7.82  26.65  99.68  77.74
Italy  92.03  67.48  33.88  25.41  91.54  73.86
United  Kingdom  144.3  75.35  70.77  70.56  91.16  76.1734
Table 6




China  -.058  .0002
(1.89)  (1.65)
Hongkong  -.029  .001
(2.66)  (1.50)
Korea  .02  -.001
(.09)  (.07)
b)  clothing
China  -.005  .0002
(2.14)  (1.60)
Hongkong  -.016  .0001
(2.98)  (1.82)
Korea  -.02  .0001
(2.50)  (2.12)
Legend:
UV:  (quality corrected)  unit values
UR:  quota utilization  rate
t-statistics  in parentheses.35
Appendix 1
Ten Most Important MFA Categories-EC
1  Cotton yarn
2  Woven  fabrics of cotton
3  Woven  fabrics of synthetic  fibers
4  Shirts, t-shirts, 'ightweight, knitted  or crocheted
5  Jerseys, pullovers, slip-overs, waistcoats,  cardigans, knitted or crocheted
6  M&B woven breeches, W&G woven trousers, of WIC/MMF
7  W&G blouses, shirts, and shirt-blouses,  of W/C/MMF
8  M&B shirts, other than knitted or crocheted,  of W/C/MMF
15  W&G woven overcoats, raincoats and other coats of C/MMF
21  Parkas, anoraks
26  W&G dresses, of W/C/MMFFIGURE 1
INEFFICIENCIES FROM REALLOCATIONS FROM CONSTRAINED
EXPORTING COUNTRIES TO DOMESTIC SUPPLIERS AND FROM
REALLOCATIONS AMONG CONSTRAINED EXPORTING COUNTRIES
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INEFFICIENT ALLOCATION AMONG CONSUMERS  IN
CONSTRAINED  AND UNCONSTRAINED  IMPORTING COUNTRIES
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DISTRIBUTION  OF FULLY  UTILIZE  1) QUO  TAS (>80%9o)
BY PRODUCT  CATEGORIES
1989  15  26  1  6 3  171 21  4  2  5  8
1988  is  26  1  6  3  7  21  4  2  8  5
1987  1s  26  1  6  3  21  7  2  4  8
1986  26  1  6  3  4  S  2  8
3
1985  26  1  6  4  7  21  5  8  2
,,  . |  {  -.  p  I  *  p 
0  2%  4%  6%  8%  10%  12%  14%  16%  18%  20%
Percentage  of total fully-utilized  quotas
Legend: Numbers  refer to product categories  listed in Appendix 1FIGURE 9
DISTBUTION  OF FULLY UTILIZED QUOTAS (>80%o)
BY EXPORTING COUNTRIES
1989  B  y  T  P  CTbKH  ,
1988  M  TTH  CK
1987  BMYP  I  TTbH  KC  0
1986  M  B I Y  P  T  CH  K  °
B  c 1985  Ml  PYlTH  K  O
0  5%  10%  15%  20%  25%  30%  35%  40%  45%
Percentage of total fully-utilized quotas
Legend:  B=Brazil  C=China  I=lndia  H=Hong  Kong  K=Korea
M=Malaysia  O=Other  P=Pakistan  T=Taiwan  Th=TtlWland
Y=YugoslaviaFIGURE 10
DISTRIBUTION OF FULLY UTILIZED  QUOTAS  (>80%)
BY IMPORTING  COUNTRIES
1989  P  0  IRL  E  DK  F  BNL  D  UK
1988  P  a  1  IRL  E  DK  F  BNL  D  UK
1987  P  G  IRL  B  I  DX  P  BNL UK  D
1986  P  J  IPL  I  DK  F  UK  BNL  D
1985  G  IRL  I  DK  F  UK  BNL  D
0  24  4%  6%  8%  10%  12%  14%  16%  18%  20%
Percentage  of total fully-utilized  quotas
LEGEND:  BNL=Benelux  r  =Germany  DK=Denmark  E=Spain  F=France
G=Greece  l=ltaly  IRL=Ireland  P=PortugalPollcy  Research Working Paper Series
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